Control in mutualisms: combined implications of partner choice and bargaining roles.
When two species form a mutualistic association, the degree of control that each has over the interaction may be pivotal in determining the relative benefit each obtains. We incorporate the capacity for partner choice into a model of mutualism based on the exchange of goods and/or services, where one guild of mutualists plays the role of proposer (proposing a price at which the goods and/or services will be exchanged) and the other plays the role of responder (accepting or rejecting the deal). We show how the payoff structure in this scenario and other closely related ones correspond to the ultimatum and demand games of economics. In the model, there are both costs and benefits to a guild whose players have control over interactions. Control over interactions in the sense of being able to exercise partner choice can benefit a guild by selecting for mutualism in its partners, but is most effective in selecting against moderately exploitative partners, and so can give highly exploitative partners an advantage. This can generate dynamics similar to taxon cycles or those seen in models with competition-colonization tradeoffs, wherein increasingly more mutualistic partners (acting as superior competitors) are selected for up to a tipping point, at which highly exploitative strategies (akin to superior colonizers) gain an advantage. Control over interactions in the sense of being able to appropriate 'surplus' payoffs in each interaction, which is selected for within-guild and is equivalent to playing the role of responders, selects against high demands (and so for mutualism) in the guild with control. Combining the two mechanisms, a high degree of mutualism in both guilds and coexistence of more mutualistic and more exploitative strategies within each are both consistent with control over the interaction being highly skewed toward one side that does what is in its own short-term interests.